The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end.
March 2011 Vol. 109 No. 5 THE REVIEW
The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation
//
VIEW PDF
PAST ISSUES
of The Review
The Online Companion
CURRENT FEATURES
RESPONSES
& Other Current Events
Rethinking Reporter's Privilege
Forty years ago, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court made its first and only inquiry into...Standing's Expected Value
This Article argues in favor of standing based on expected value of harm. Standing doctrine has been...Counsel's Control over the Presentation of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing
The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to control his defense and the right to a lawyer's...Law-Enforcement Officers and Self-Help Repossession: A State-Action Approach
Repossession of secured collateral is a fundamental component of the consumer credit industry. The...Doing Affirmative Action
Sometime this year the Supreme Court will announce its holding in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, a...
MAILING LIST
Sign Up to Join Our Mailing List