Pay-to-stay jails expose the moral tension between the dominant theories of punishment: retributivism and deterrence. A turn to a third major moral theory-virtue ethics-resolves this tension. According to virtue ethics, the moral worth of an action follows from both the character of the action and the disposition of the actor. Virtuous acts promote human flourishing-the central goal of life-when they are the right actions performed for the right reasons. The virtue ethics theory of punishment suggests that pay-to-stay jails conflict with the promotion of human flourishing. . . . Furthermore, the resolution of the pay-to-stay jails dilemma using virtue ethics highlights why retributivism and deterrence should be rejected as theories of punishment in favor of a virtue ethics-based approach.

Several proposals for changing the manner in which electoral votes are assigned have been increasingly debated since the 2008 presidential campaign began. Among these are recent suggestions that states assign their electoral votes based on the popular vote results in individual congressional districts or assign their electoral votes statewide based on the national popular vote. The symposium contributors explore the viability and advisability in today’s political climate of these and other Electoral College reform proposals.

Although recent proposals for modifying the Electoral College process have focused mainly on how electoral votes are assigned, another problem with the current system has received less attention: the timetable for resolving post-election disputes over electors. Under 3 U.S.C. § 5, the so-called “safe harbor” provision of federal law, a state can be assured of having its chosen slate of electors recognized only if post-election disputes are resolved within thirty-five days of Election Day. As a practical matter, this provision doesn’t provide states enough time to complete recount and contest proceedings in the event of a close, contested election.

The genius of our United States Constitution is the delicate balance our Founding Fathers struck between empowering a national government and preserving the inherent sovereignty of individual states. Any proposed governmental reform that would interfere with that balance should be looked upon skeptically. Recent proposals to do away with the Electoral College in favor of a national popular vote for President deserve such careful examination. But that does not mean that reform is out of reach. We have only to look to the Constitution itself to find that the answer lies in the self-interest of each state.

The unfairness of the proposed California Presidential Election Reform Act is obvious: in a close election, the Act virtually assures that California’s fifty-five electoral votes, which would be expected to go entirely to the Democratic presidential candidate under the traditional statewide-winner-take-all system, will instead be split, with more than a third of them going to the Republican candidate. Implementing this “reform” in the nation’s largest Democratic state, but not in any of the large Republican states (like Texas), is roughly the equivalent of handing over to the Republicans the state of Illinois. What is less obvious is that the Act would be unfair and unwise even if it applied nationwide.

In democratic theory, the ballot is the most perfect expression of the democratic commitment to the moral equality of persons. . . . The ballot not only gives citizens their voice in government, it also makes their voices equal. In practice, however, democracies have erected all sorts of impediments to the ideal of equal voice, such as restrictions on suffrage, legislative malapportionments, and discriminatory gerrymanders. Among the most egregious impediments, however, are surely the systems of indirect election purported to filter and to refine the voice of the people. The Electoral College is one such system. This Commentary examines the effects of that system and the proposed reforms to it on the prospect of equal voice in elections.

The Electoral College is a relic from another time and is in tension with the modern constitutional command of “one person, one vote.” But the Electoral College is, nevertheless, ensconced in our Constitution—and, as a result, we would need to amend the document to alter or abolish it from our political fabric. Still, some states are toying with state-based Electoral College reforms. Thus, irrespective of whether voters in those states favor the abolition of the Electoral College through a federal constitutional amendment, they must critically examine the democratic merits of these state-based reform options. Categorically rejecting all state-based reform is unwise, owing to obvious and substantial barriers to direct federal or constitutional action.

The idea of reforming the Electoral College recurs each time a presidential election nears. Polls show that an overwhelming majority of respondents support abolishing the Electoral College in favor of direct popular election of the President. Yet, it is doubtful whether these polls really imply that such a move would be best for the country. Despite the seeming simplicity of direct popular presidential election, its introduction in the United States—a country in which the clear separation of powers between the states and the federal government has existed for more than two centuries—would have hidden drawbacks that the media and pollsters usually fail to communicate.

The National Popular Vote (“NPV”) movement is designed to eliminate the federalist impact of the Electoral College without amending the Constitution. By fashioning an interstate compact to grant participating states’ electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, NPV proponents suppose they can induce states to forfeit their electoral “weights” and replace the current, federalist election process with a fully majoritarian one. But by leaving the Electoral College in place, the NPV movement is setting itself up for a double pushback: first, in the form of immediate legal resistance, and second, through states’ long-term involvement in a meaningfully intact federalist system

The New Jersey Supreme Court will consider this term whether regulations promulgated pursuant to a law mandating humane treatment of farm animals go far enough. The regulations reportedly do not prohibit castrating male piglets without anesthesia, removing chicken beaks and turkey claws without painkillers, or confining veal calves and pregnant sows in cages small enough to restrict turning around. As this ongoing debate shows, the extent to which animal protection laws should apply to the agricultural industry remains in dispute. In addition to considering the merits of factory farming and animal protection, the symposium poses the larger question: Should laws criminalizing animal abuse apply to animals raised for food?

One morning in January 2008, images of horrific animal cruelty were blasted by Internet, television, and print media throughout the country. The story was all the more shocking in that the animals at issue were cows at a commercial slaughter plant—a place from which Americans usually avert their gaze. The images of dairy cows so ill or injured that they could not stand, being battered, shocked, and nearly drowned to force them into the kill box, struck a chord with the American public. Abusing downed animals is at odds with our venerable national public policy against torturing animals.

Should laws criminalizing animal abuse apply to animals raised for food?” The answer is yes, and yes especially because farm animals are generally now under the control of business corporations. State and federal criminal law have proved critical in modifying corporate policy and practice in other areas, a current example being worker safety. Criminal liability today would include criminal liability of the corporate entity itself, and would thus also introduce the most effective regulation of individual handling of farm animals—regulation by the corporation, which has methods and resources public agencies cannot match.

Since the beginning of history, people have used farm animals to assist with their work and to provide a source of food. These agricultural pursuits were not questioned; rather, they were a widely-accepted way of life. In fact, many people still say that the very purpose of livestock on this Earth is to provide these resources for mankind. As for the proper way to treat our livestock, we commonly hear farmers and livestock producers make comments like, “If we take care of the animals, they will take care of us,” and, “We treat our animals well because that’s just good business.”

The most abused beings in the United States are those whom we raise and kill for food. The numbers of dead are staggering. Most are victims of the severe and almost entirely unregulated practices that Americans permit on their factory farms. According to the United States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, in 2007, a total of 10.4 billion land-based animals were killed by the American food industry. These included 9.4 billion broiler chickens, 450 million laying hens, 317 million turkeys, 121 million pigs, 39 million bovines, 28 million ducks, 10 million rabbits, and 4 million sheep and goats—fifty times the number killed in biomedical research, for sport, as pests, and for all other reasons combined, carrying a value of hundreds of billions of dollars a year. The degree to which animal enslavement is embedded in our society is difficult to calculate or fathom.

The lawsuit pitting the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals against the New Jersey Department of Agriculture brings into sharp focus the issue of animal rights versus animal welfare that has been dividing animal activists, farmers, and society for decades. On one side are proponents of animal rights—a set of rights articulated by humans but granted to animals to govern how we treat them. For many believers this includes the right not to be owned and certainly not to be eaten. On the other side are proponents of animal welfare—also a set of human derived standards governing how we care for animals under our control. Animal welfare concerns are reflected in laws prohibiting cruelty and criminalizing certain abusive behavior.

Everyone reading this Article is doubtless aware of the woeful lack of legal protection for farm animals in the United States. Not only do the laws fail to assure even a minimally decent life for the majority of these animals, they do not provide protection against the most egregious treatment. As both a philosopher who has helped articulate new emerging societal ethics for animals, and as one who has successfully developed laws embodying that ethic—notably the 1985 federal laws protecting laboratory animals—I will stress the direction we need to move in the future to enfranchise farm animals.

Laws criminalizing animal abuse should apply to the agricultural industry. When we exempt the agricultural industry from these laws, factory farms increase production to unnaturally high levels. This increased production causes devastating environmental effects, such as climate change, water shortages, and the loss of topsoil. In light of these effects, the law needs to do much more to regulate the agricultural industry, and the first step should be to criminalize cruelty to agricultural animals. This would force the industry to slow down production to more natural levels that are much less harmful to the environment.