The Supreme Court,
the Federal Circuit,
and Patent Law
more
Televising the
Supreme Court
more
MCRImore
TDRA of 2006more

Death Penalty

Partisan Gerrymandering
Confrontation Clause
 
 
An Online Symposium on Partisan Gerrymandering
The Supreme Court's opinion in the consolidated LULAC v. Perry case re-defines both the extent and scope of constitutional Partisan Gerrymandering as well as the restrictions placed on state legislatures by the Voting Rights Act. In this online discussion, seven authors offer their perspective on the future of Partisan Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in light of Perry.
From Laredo to Fort Worth
Ellen D. Katz, University of Michigan Law School
When Texas stifled the eager and energized Latino electorate in Laredo, it engaged in a classic form of racial vote dilution. But it also stifled competition, doing harm not just to a racially-informed political community on the cusp of victory, but to all voters in the district for whom vibrant political participation was no longer an option.

Strict in Theory, Loopy in Fact
Nathaniel Persily, University of Pennsylvania Law School
The truly unprecedented development in the case for me was Justice Scalia's vote to uphold what he considered a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause, but one that survived strict scrutiny. This essay tries to explain why his opinion is important, both in its own right and with respect to its implications for how he might consider the upcoming challenges to the newly reauthorized Voting Rights Act.

Cultural Compactness
Daniel R. Ortiz, University of Virginia School of Law
The Supreme Court's opinions in LULAC v. Perry, the Texas redistricting case, confounded expectation. While many believed that the Court would develop the law governing partisan gerrymandering in one direction or another, it did not. As exactly before, such claims are justiciable but there is no law to govern them.

Some Clarity, More Uncertainty
Richard Briffault, Columbia Law School
The Court's difficulty is understandable. Gerrymandering is a challenge to democratic self-government, but judicial intervention requires a judicially manageable theory of democracy compatible with the Constitution and our political institutions. It remains to be seen whether the Court can agree upon such a theory. Vieth and LULAC suggest that the outlook is not promising.

This Way to the Egress
Bernard Grofman, University of California at Irvine
Indeed, there's nothing in LULAC to prevent Texas Republicans from taking yet another bite at the redistricting apple in time for the 2008 election--say by adjusting some lines ever so slightly so as to make it easier to defeat one or more potentially vulnerable Democratic incumbents.

Self-Defeating Minimalism
Adam B. Cox, University of Chicago Law School
Everyone wants a piece of Tom DeLay. The former majority leader is under investigation and indictment, and even the Supreme Court threatened last Term to undo one of his signal achievements. In 2003, DeLay orchestrated a highly unusual mid-decade revision of Texas's congressional map. The revised map was a boon to Republicans, shifting the Texas congressional delegation from 15 Republicans and 17 Democrats to 21 Republicans and 11 Democrats.

Anthony Kennedy's Blind Quest
Scot Powe & Steve Bickerstaff, University of Texas School of Law
If, as we fear, state and local governments follow the precedent of Texas and engage in unnecessary, wasteful, and acrimonious redistricting using inaccurate population data to benefit partisan interests, we would like to believe the justices will regret their decision in LULAC v. Perry. But we doubt that will happen because there was also an air of unreality about the challenge to the 2003 gerrymander. This is, after all, the Court (and a justice) that assisted George W. Bush into the White House. Could anyone believe it was realistic to expect it (or him) to unseat six Republican Congressmen to assist Nancy Pelosi into the Speaker's Chair?

© Copyright Michigan Law Review, All Rights Reserved.