This Article offers a defense of the Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine, the controversial rule that information loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a third party. Fourth Amendment scholars have repeatedly attacked the rule on the ground that it is unpersuasive on its face and gives the government too much power. This Article responds that critics have overlooked the benefits of the rule and have overstated its weaknesses.
Irrelevant Oversight: “Presidential Administration” from the Standpoint of Arbitrary and Capricious Review
The president is now regularly and heavily involved in the decision-making processes of administrative agencies. What began in the mid-twentieth century as macro-level oversight has evolved, since the Reagan Administration, into controlling case-level influence. Scholars have hotly debated the legality of this shift and have compellingly demonstrated the need to ensure that agencies remain accountable and that their decisions remain nonarbitrary in the face of presidential involvement. However, as this Note demonstrates, the existing scholarship has not provided an adequate solution to these twin problems.