The first two terms of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency (1933–1941) were periods of great administrative innovation. Responding to the Great Depression, Congress created scores of new administrative agencies charged with overseeing economic policy and implementing novel social welfare programs. The story of the constitutional difficulties that some of these policy innovations encountered is a staple of both New Deal historiography and the constitutional history of twentieth-century America. There has been very little writing, however, about how courts and the New Deal–era administrative state interacted after these constitutional battles ended.
State antitrust laws ordinarily supplement federal law by providing a cause of action for anticompetitive activity that occurs in the state. Some states, however, have construed their antitrust regimes to reach conduct that occurs outside the state’s boundaries. Such regulation raises significant federalism and Commerce Clause concerns by creating possible extraterritorial liability for conduct with virtually no in-state effect. This Note examines two Commerce Clause standards that may limit the degree to which state antitrust laws may exercise extraterritorial force—the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause and the so-called “Extraterritorial Principle.”