In the wake of closely contested elections, calls for laws that require voters to present photo identification as a condition to cast a ballot have become pervasive. Advocates tend to rely on two rhetorical devices: (1) anecdotes about a couple of elections tainted by voter fraud; and (2) “common sense” arguments that voters should produce photo identification because identification is required to board airplanes, buy alcohol, and engage in other activities. This Article explains the analytical shortcomings of anecdote, analogy, and intuition, and applies a cost-benefit approach generally overlooked in election law scholarship.

One overlooked issue in the voluminous literature on the Second Amendment is what standard of review should apply to gun control if the Amendment is read to protect an individual right to bear arms. This lack of attention may be due to the assumption that strict scrutiny would necessarily apply because the right would be “fundamental” or because the right is located in the Bill of Rights. In this Article, Professor Winkler challenges that assumption and considers the arguments for a contrary conclusion: that the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms is appropriately governed by a deferential, reasonableness review under which nearly all gun control laws would survive judicial review. 

Sixty years ago, in Kotteakos v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a small class of so-called harmless errors committed by courts did not require correction. The Court acknowledged that some judicial errors, though recognizable as errors, did not threaten the validity of criminal convictions and therefore did not require reversal. Specifically, the Court held that errors that violated federal statutes should be deemed harmless unless they had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

In 1999, the Supreme Court held that the common law principle that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent was embedded in the Constitution’s structure when it was ratified. The Court, however, has not always adhered to this view. In 1793, when a citizen of South Carolina sued the State of Georgia to enforce a debt arising from the sale of Revolutionary War supplies, the Court ordered the State to fulfill its obligation even though the State had not consented to the suit.