For decades, constitutional doctrine has held that the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech applies equally to laws adopted by the federal, state, and local governments. Nevertheless, the identity of the government actor behind a law may be a significant, if unrecognized, factor in free speech cases. This Article reports the results of a comprehensive study of core free speech cases decided by the federal courts over a 14-year period. The study finds that speech-restrictive laws adopted by the federal government are far more likely to be upheld than similar laws adopted by state and local governments.

This Article explores why the law treats negative externalities (harms) and positive externalities (benefits) differently. Ideally, from an economic perspective, both negative and positive externalities should be internalized by those who produce them, for with full internalization, injurers and benefactors alike would behave efficiently. In actuality, however, whereas the law requires that injurers bear the harms they create (or wrongfully create), benefactors are seldom entitled to recover for benefits they voluntarily confer on recipients without the latter's consent ("unrequested benefits").

The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 allowed the owner of a vessel to limit his liability in the case of an accident to the value of the vessel and its cargo if he could show he had no knowledge of or participation in the negligent act that resulted in the loss. In 1911, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. Harmon, a case which was interpreted for several decades to hold that the Limitation Act formed an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In a 1990 case, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that it would not reach the question of whether the Limitation Act was an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction-which several Courts of Appeal took to mean that the Act's continued vitality as a jurisdictional basis was an open question. Since that time, many Courts of Appeal have held that the Limitation Act is not, for a variety of reasons, an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction.

Courts have long faced difficulty interpreting loss causation under Section 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934. This difficulty stems from the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between this core element of common law fraud and the procedural demands of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the typical vehicle for a 10b-5 class action. Recently, some courts and commentators have begun to consider loss causation as an individualized inquiry that is not common among class members, and one that therefore warrants consideration at the class certification stage. The existing justifications center on the conceptually distinct 10b-5 element of reliance, an unsuitable basis for considering loss causation at class certification. This Note provides an alternative justification for consideration of loss causation at class certification: the class definition.