Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated with liberty, on the one hand, and equality, on the other. We finish by discussing how attentiveness to borrowing may illuminate or improve prominent theories of constitutional lawmaking.

Michael Halley has written a First Impressions essay response to Professors Tebbe and Tsai.

The claims of a patent are its boundaries, defining the scope of exclusion. This boundary function of claims is undermined by the fact that claims can be changed throughout the life of the patent, thereby moving the patent boundary. A boundary that can be moved at-will is one that the public cannot rely upon.

This Article explores the problems of malleable patent boundaries. If a claim can be amended to permit a patentee to capture something he did not foresee when filing the patent application, the amendment confers an unexpected windfall that did not contribute to incentives to invent before filing. If a claim is amended so that a patentee can capture something he did foresee but mistakenly failed to claim initially, the amendment allows the patentee to shift the loss of his own mistake to third parties. Either way, the amendment is inefficient.

Many public and private universities around the country employ legacy admissions preferences in order to give children of alumni special consideration in the admissions process. Such preferences disproportionately benefit white applicants at the cost of their nonwhite counterparts, because past generations of college students were less diverse than today's applicant pool. However, universities argue that their legacy preferences are justified because they assist in alumni fundraising efforts. This Note presents a statistical analysis to argue that legacy preferences are prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they have a discriminatory effect on minority college applicants and have not been shown to promote (and do not promote) any legitimate university purpose.

The United States is home to one of the most investor-friendly securities antifraud regimes in the world. Corporate misstatements that form the basis for a cause of action under one of the many antifraud provisions arise in a variety of contexts, an important one being as violations of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). For several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been considering changing the standardized accounting practice in the United States from GAAP to International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") to promote comparability between global investment opportunities. IFRS is a principles-based system of accounting, while GAAP is rules based. Because of the flexibility of financial reporting inherent in the principles-based approach of IFRS, investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission will face greater difficulty in relying on accounting violations to establish the elements of the securities antifraud causes of action if IFRS is adopted.