The continued growth of forensic DNA databases has brought about greater interest in a search method known as "familial" or "kinship" matching. Whereas a typical database search seeks the source of a crime-scene stain by making an exact match between a known person and the DNA sample, familial searching instead looks for partial matches in order to find potential relatives of the source. The use of a familial DNA search to identify the alleged "Grim Sleeper" killer in California brought national attention to the method, which has many proponents. In contrast, this Article argues against the practice of familial searching on a variety of grounds, including claims related to equality, accuracy, privacy, racial discrimination, and democratic accountability. It then addresses the legality of the method. Lastly, in the event that arguments to prohibit the practice prove unpersuasive, this Article sets forth recommendations for restrictions on familial searches that might ameliorate their possible iniquitous effects.

This Article explores what happens to longstanding remedies for past racial discrimination as conditions change.  It shows that Congress and the Supreme Court have responded quite differently to changed conditions when they evaluate such remedies.  Congress has generally opted to stay the course, while the Court has been more inclined to view change as cause to terminate a remedy.    The Article argues that these very different responses share a defining flaw, namely, they treat existing remedies as fixed until they are terminated.  As a result, remedies are either scrapped prematurely or left stagnant despite dramatically changed conditions.

The Article seeks to map out a better response to changed conditions than the all or nothing options that presently define the debate.  It argues that longstanding remedies should neither be terminated nor continued indefinitely, but instead should be adapted to better address changed circumstances.  Specifically, the Article calls for a shift in remedial focus away from the effects of past discrimination to the local institutions that must deal with those effects most directly.  It calls on courts, legislators and voters to adapt remedies so that they provide institutions of local governance with the skills and resources needed to operate fairly in an environment inexorably shaped by past discrimination and in which some effects endure.

Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is normally obligated to attend all of the proceedings against her. However, Rule 43(b)(2) carves out an exception for organizational defendants, stating that they "need not be present" if represented by an attorney. On its face, however, the language of 43(b)(2) is ambiguous: is it the defendant or the judge who has the discretion to decide whether the defendant appears? That is, may a judge compel the presence of an organizational defendant? This Note addresses the ambiguity in the context of the plea colloquy, considering the text of several of the Rules, the purposes behind the plea colloquy proceeding, and the inherent powers doctrine. It argues that district court judges do in fact have the authority to compel an organizational defendant's presence at a plea colloquy.

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system. Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars, and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the decisions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the current proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected. Although the bills take different approaches to their goal of overruling Twombly and Iqbal, each one would disrupt the careful balance of interests created by the Federal Rules and create intolerable confusion for judges ruling on the often-filed 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Especially because the long-term effects of Twombly and Iqbal on federal pleading remain unclear, Congress should avoid a rush to judgment on this important issue.